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TRADEMARK REGISTRATION OF PRODUCT
COLORS: ISSUES AND ANSWERS
Lee Burgunder*
I. INTRODUCTION
In October, 1985, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Owens-Corning was entitled to register the color "pink" as a
trademark for its fibrous glass residential insulation.' Yet, before this
date, the law was well-settled that an overall product color could not
be appropriated as a trademark.' Thus, one might think that the
Owens-Corning decision represented a controversial turning point in
trademark theory with respect to the federal registration of colors. In
reality, however, the decision merely marked one more step on the
path of confusion upon which the courts recently have been treading
in the field of product color trademark registration.
Currently, courts focus on the "functionality" of colors in trade-
mark cases.8 In light of the demands of competition in a free-market
© 1986 by Lee Burgunder
* Associate Professor of Law, California Polytechnic State University.
1. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
2. See, e.g., 3 R. CAI.MANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOIES § 18.13, at 91 (4th ed. 1983) ("ITlhe law is well-settled today that the overall
color of a product . . . is not entitled to registration." Id.); 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:16, at 178 (2d ed. 1984) ("[A] color, per se, is not capable of
appropriation as a trademark." Id.); North Shore Laboratories Corp. v. Cohen, 721 F.2d 514,
521 (5th Cir. 1983); Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 161 (1st Cir.
1977); Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug Co., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959); In reSwift & Co., 223 F.2d 950, 955 (C.C.P.A. 1955); Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175F.2d 795, 798-99 (3d Cir. 1949); In re Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 86 F.2d 830, 833 (C.C.P.A.
1936); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 99-100 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff d, 721
F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
3. See, e.g., Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1116; W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 228U.S.P.Q. 145 (7th Cir. 1985); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78 (3d
Cir. 1982); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981); Vuitton et Fil S.A.
v. J. Young Enterprises, 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981); Plastilite Corp. v. Kassner Imports,
508 F.2d 824 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952);
Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4 (7th Cir. 1950); Diamond Match Co. v.Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727 (6th Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 589 (1906); Famolare,
Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff d mera., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir.1981); Deere & Co., 560 F. Supp. at 85; Ventura Travelware Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co.,
322 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1971), 66 Misc. 2d 646, affd, 328 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972).
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society, this investigation is necessary. Lumped into the concept of
functionality,4 however, are totally separate issues involving the pro-
tectability of generic and descriptive marks,5 and the potential loss of
trademark rights through the "genericide" doctrine.6 The coalescing
of these distinct considerations is somewhat responsible for the un-
certain state of affairs in product color registration cases.
The purpose of this article is to clarify the pertinent issues with
regard to the federal trademark registration of product colors, and to
propose a new coherent standard for evaluating the propriety of per-
mitting such registration in individual cases.7 The article first consid-
ers the importance to an efficient free-market economy of protecting
the right of product imitation, and the rationales for granting certain
statutory and common law exceptions to this right. In this discussion,
the concept of functionality is introduced. The next section presents a
thorough examination of the proper role of trademarks in the com-
petitive scheme, and highlights the potential market dangers of ge-
neric and descriptive marks. The article then reviews in depth the
doctrine of functionality, and examines the inconsistent judicial ap-
plications of the doctrine to product colors. In this regard, the
Owens-Corning case serves as an excellent example of how the
courts often misapply the functionality concept. Finally, the article
offers an analytical approach based on the economic effects of prod-
uct color registration as a substitute for the prevailing functionality
standard.
II. THE RIGHT OF PRODUCT IMITATION
It is undisputed that equal access to disclosed ideas is the cor-
nerstone to the United States market economy.' The unhindered
4. See infra notes 120-42 and accompanying text.
5. A generic mark is the common descriptive designation of a product. See infra notes 73
& 83. A descriptive mark is one of the several names by which a product can be described. See
infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
6. Genericide applies when a once protectable mark becomes unprotectable because it
has become generic. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
7. For the purposes of this article, "product color" includes packaging color. Also, al-
though "product color" may range from one primary color to a complex design consisting of
several colors, this article focuses on the former end of the spectrum. However, the principles
enunciated herein and the proper economic test apply equally to the entire spectrum of product
designs, and indeed to all forms of aesthetic product features.
8. See, e.g., Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969) ("[Flederal law requires that all
ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good, unless excluded by an exclusive
privilege such as that provided by patent." Id.); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6
(1966); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269
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availability of ideas allows any person to enhance disclosed concepts,
thereby improving that person's own welfare, and, in turn, the wel-
fare of society as a whole.' Consider, for example, the welfareeffects
of a new product idea that is publicly disclosed by its introduction in
the marketplace. With equal access to the invention, competitors will
be induced to achieve short-term supranormal profits10 by selling the
product at a lower price than the inventor, or by making improve-
ments upon it (either through designing production techniques which
reduce the cost of manufacture, or through embellishing the product
in such a way as to stimulate additional demand for it)." The result
is an improvement in net welfare to consumers either because the
product price falls, the social cost of production falls, or the value of
the product rises. Conversely, if the manufacturer were granted ex-
clusive use of the invention, the manufacturer would be in a position
to earn long-term supranormal profits, thereby reducing social net
welfare.1 2 For these reasons, it has long been held that there exists a
fundamental right to compete through imitation of a competitor's
product."
The above discussion explains that social net welfare will be
maximized if disclosed ideas are freely accessible to all. However, in
an environment of competitive imitation, the manufacturer may not
have the incentives to create the novel idea in the first place.1 4 A
F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959) ("Imitation is the life blood of
competition." Id.); Nimetz, Design Protection, 15 COPYRIGHT L. SYMp. 79 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow Warren Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir.),
320 U.S. 758 (1943) ("[Tlhere is a basic public policy, deep-rooted in our economy and
respected by the courts, resting on the assumption that social welfare is best advanced by free
competition .. " Id.); Vagelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (Mass. 1896) ("IFIree
competition is worth more to society than it costs." Id.)
10. "Supranormal profit" or "pure economic profit" represents a return on investment
in excess of that obtainable on other ventures of similar risk. See C.E. FERGUSON & J.P.
GOULD, MICROF(X)NOMIm THEORY 244 (4th ed. 1975).
11. The supranormal profits will be of a limited duration since competitive equilibrium
will be reached when average costs, which include a normal return to capital, equals revenue.
12. Monopoly power allows the seller to raise prices, which results in a lower quantity
of the product produced than is socially optimal, and thereby creates a dead-weight loss to
society. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 242-43 (1976).
13. In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982). SeeSpratling, The Protectability of Package, Container and Product Configurations (Part 1), 5
U.S.F. L. REV. 451, 464-65 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Spratling (Part I)].
14. See Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REV.
873 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate] ("lAllthough short-
range competitive interests would benefit from immediate and free public access to technologi-
cal and artistic innovation, to permit such access would destroy incentive to innovate; newproducts and works would not be introduced into the market and consequently the long range
competitive situation would decline." Id.)
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manufacturer will not devote resources to the creation of an idea if
the manufacturer's competitors will be able to employ that idea, once
disclosed, without incurring any research and development expendi-
tures. The manufacturer would be placed at a competitive disadvan-
tage relative to the imitators since the imitators are able to take a
"free ride" on the manufacturer's own investment. Thus, the manu-
facturer, rather than risk its own capital on developing novel ideas,
has incentive to wait for other manufacturers to conceive new prod-
uct developments, so that it might "free ride" off of other manufac-
turers' investments. Similarly, there may be little incentive for any
manufacturer to develop new ideas.
The investment disincentives caused by the free-rider effect have
required courts and legislatures to establish certain limited excep-
tions to the fundamental tenet of free competition. 5 The most im-
portant exceptions are utility and design patent protection, copyright
protection, and source identification protection through unfair com-
petition and trademark laws.
A. The Patent System
The objective of the utility patent laws is to encourage an in-
ventor of a useful or functional article to disclose that invention to
the public." To achieve this goal, the patent laws provide the inven-
tor a seventeen year period of exclusive use of a utilitarian inven-
tion. " During this period, it is expected that the inventor can recoup
the costs of conceiving the invention, plus a normal return to capi-
tal,16 through the supranormal profits generated by exclusive use of
the invention. Thus, given the prospect of a reasonable return on
research and development expenses, manufacturers logically will
make these investments.
In order to receive patent protection, a functional invention
15. See, e.g., Note, Competition, Right to Copy and Secondary Meaning, 1963 WASH.
U.L.Q. 224-42; Spratling (Part 1), supra note 13, at 465; see generally Goldstein, The Com-
petitive Mandate, supra note 14, at 873.
16. See, e.g., To promote the Progress of. . . Useful Arts, REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 1-3 (1966) (cited in P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT,
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 19 (1973)); KAHN, THE ROLE OF
PATENTS (cited in MILLER, COMPETITION, CARTELS AND THEIR REGULATION 311 (1962));
Spratling (Part I), supra note 13, at 485; 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 6:1.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. IV 1980).
18. "Normal return to capital" is the expected future cash flow necessary to attract
capital to a venture of a given risk in a competitive capital environment. See J. VAN HORNE,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 168-70 (4th ed. 1977).
[Vol. 26
TRADEMARK OF PRODUCT COLORS
must be novel and non-obvious." If an invention does not meet these
standards of the patent exception, the public retains the right to
freely copy the invention. This concept is the basis for the function-
ality doctrine. Essentially the doctrine provides that any idea, pro-
cess, or article which is entitled to patent protection cannot be ex-
cluded from the public's general right of imitation, when the idea
has been denied patent protection or when patent protection has ex-
pired.20 Thus, for example, one cannot protect a functional article
from imitation by obtaining copyright or trademark protection of
it. 2 1
The design patent laws provide a similar exception to the gen-
eral right of imitation.22 The purpose of design patents is to stimu-
late the development of novel2 ' ornamental or non-mechanical prod-
uct features24 which are related to the product's artistic appearance
rather than to its performance.2 5 A holder of a design patent is enti-
tled to exclusive use of the design for a maximum of fourteen
years.2 '
Unlike utilitarian patents, an ornamental design which is the
proper subject matter for design patent protection may be protected
by other state and federal laws, even when the design is denied de-
sign patent protection. However, this right is strictly construed.
19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (1976). See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 1; In re Borst, 345
F.2d 851 (C.C.P.A. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 973 (1966).
20. See infra notes 56-65 ard accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Note, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic Functionality: A Threat to Trade-
mark Protection of Aesthetic Production Features, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 353 (1982)[hereinafter cited as Aesthetic Production Features]; Cooper, Trademark Aspects of Pharma-
ceutical Product Design, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 1, 7-15 (1980); Note, The Public Interest
and the Right to Copy Nonfunctional Product Features, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 317(1977) [hereinafter cited as Nonfunctional Product Features]; Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at
1120-21; In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985); New England Butt v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 756 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496
(C.C.P.A. 1961); Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
22. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-73 (1976).
23. See Spratling (Part I), supra note 13, at 486. See, e.g., R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's,
Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 500 (3d Cir. 1956); In re Walter, 39 F.2d 724 (C.C.P.A. 1930).
24. 1 J. MCCArHY, supra note 2, at § 7:30. See In re Faustmann, 155 F.2d 388
(C.C.P.A. 1946).
25. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295 (9th
Cir. 1970); West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 840 (1955); Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d
428 (6th Cir. 1933).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1982).
27. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964), affd, 372 F.2d
539 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1334, 1348 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1080 (1974).
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Thus, a design which is not protected by a design patent may be
protected as a trademark only if the design serves merely functions
properly performed by trademarks."8
B. Copyright
The copyright laws protect the expression of ideas fixed in tan-
gible forms2' by restricting the right to copy83 that expression to the
copyright holder for his life plus fifty years."' The expression is enti-
tled to copyright protection if it is original to the copyright claim-
ant." This statutory exception to the general rule of free imitation
encourages individuals to engage in artistic creativity. The temporary
grant of exclusivity is necessary because investments in creativity
might be stifled if potential creators could not recoup physical and
mental expenditures during a period of supranormal profits, un-
restricted by free riders."
As with all legal exceptions to the right of imitation, copyright
cannot deprive the public of a functional concept that is otherwise
the proper subject of patent protection. Thus, copyright protects only
the expression of an idea.3' The idea itself, once expressed, is dedi-
cated to the public. Accordingly, if the idea embodied in the expres-
sion cannot be used by others without use of the expression itself,
copyright cannot deprive the public of employing that expression.
For instance, it has been held that a bookkeeping system of blank
accounting forms may not be protected by copyright when the idea
behind the system is useless without the forms." Once again the doc-
trine of functionality resurfaces to prohibit the protection of func-
tional works by any other means besides patents.
C. Unfair Competition and Trademark Protection
State unfair competition laws and the federal trademark statute
grant to persons certain exclusive rights to identification symbols that
28. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1974).
30. Id. at § 106.
31. Id. at § 302.
32. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 669 (1936) ("[If) by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose
anew Keat's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author' and, if he copyrighted it, others
might not copy that poem .. " Id.).
33. See P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, a- 8-19.
34. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
35. Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
[Vol. 26
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are used in connection with goods and services. The various state
unfair competition laws primarily are designed to promote ethical
behavior in business by preventing one person from "palming-off"
its goods as though they were made by another."' In other words,
these laws are aimed at companies which imitate the identification
characteristics of another seller's products so as to induce consumers
to err in their purchase choices and buy the imitation goods when, in
fact, they wanted the original products. Thus, the thrust of these
laws is to prevent companies from utilizing the identifying marks of
other sellers when such application may unfairly mislead consumers
as to the source of the goods.3 7
Typically, to prevail in an unfair competition action, a trade-
mark owner must establish (1) that the subsequent user knew or
should have known about the owner's prior usage of the mark and
(2) that consumers are likely to be deceived due to their association
of the mark with the owner's goods."8 These elements are required
since a manufacturer cannot be guilty of deliberately engaging in
conduct likely to mislead consumers unless the manufacturer was
aware that consumers associate the mark with the goodwill of a par-
36. See Spratling (Part I), supra note 13, at 465-66; Goodyear India-Rubber Glove
Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598 (1888); Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139
U.S. 540 (1890).
37. See Gage-Downs Co. v. Featherbone Corset Co., 83 F. 213, 214 (C.C.W.D. Mich.
1897). The Gage-Downs court found:
[Tihe underlying principle which is effective in the solution of such cases is that
a party may not adopt a mark or symbol which has been employed by another
manufacturer, and by long use and employment on the part of that other has
come to be recognized by the public as denoting the origin of the manufacturer,
and thus impose upon the public by inducing them to believe that the goods
which this new party thus offers are the goods of the original party.
Id.
38. See E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 296 (2d
ed. 1982). The difficulty of this proof is inversely related to the distinctiveness of the mark.
Thus, if a mark is very distinctive, the subsequent user must have copied the mark. Also, the
mark can have no other meaning to consumers but to indicate the source. On the other hand, if
the mark has little distinction, either because of brevity of use or descriptiveness, then consum-
ers may not be deceived as to the source. See P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 107-08. In the
latter situation, the plaintiff will have to provide actual evidence of deceitful activities unless
the mark has "secondary meaning." Id. For a mark to have secondary meaning, the plaintiff
must show that the mark, although descriptive, is primarily associated by consumers with its
goods. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). In this case, the plaintiff
will prevail if the subsequent user should have been aware of plaintiff's usage of the mark. P.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 107-08. Product designs and colors generally are analyzed in
the same way as descriptive marks, and thus secondary meaning usually must be established
for their protection. See, e.g., Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124; Ideal Toy, 685 F.2d at 81;
Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1343; Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg.
Co., 518 F. Supp. 607, 616 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
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ticular competitive manufacturer. The state and federal trademark
statutes somewhat eliminate these elements of proof through regis-
tration. Thus, when a federal registration is obtained, other compa-
nies are given nationwide notice that the registered mark is associ-
ated by consumers with the registrant.89 In most other respects, the
federal trademark statute (the Lanham Act) is a federal embodiment
of state unfair competition principles.4 0 Accordingly, the purposes of
federal trademark protection apply to unfair competition as well.
The Lanham Act provides that, with certain exception, an ap-
plicant is entitled to register any trademark by which his goods may
be distinguished from the goods of others.41 Although "trademark"
was once interpreted to encompass only technical symbols, the mod-
ern approach is to allow any distinguishing characteristic, including
entire product designs and packaging, to be registered as a trade-
mark. " Once registration is obtained, the registrant can prevent
others from copying that mark in ways that are likely to deceive
39. The Lanham Act dictates that registration provides constructive notice of the regis-
trant's claim of ownership. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1982). Also, registration is prima facie evidence
of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark. Id. at § 1115. Thus, if a subsequent user
wishes to establish that consumers do not associate a mark with the goods of the registrant, he
will have the burden of proof. In addition, a mark becomes incontestable if not challenged
within five years of registration. Id. at § 1065(a).
40. See, e.g., In re Deister Concentrator Co., Inc., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961)
("[W]e cannot sanction registration on the Principal Register of anything unless the applicant
for registration, absent a copyright or patent, would have the right under the general law to
prevent others from using or copying it." Id.). Spratling, The Protectability of Package,
Container, and Product Configurations (Part 11), 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 172, 184 (1971-72); E.
KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 38, at 296. There is also federal protection under section
43(a) for marks that are not registered. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). The elements necessary
for recovery under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act are also codifications of the common law
of unfair competition. Note, Size, Shape, and Color of Prescription Drugs: What Scope of
Protection?, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 203, 215 (1981); Aesthetic Production Features, supra note
21, at 345 n.3.
41. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982). The exceptions are listed in sections
1052(a)-(f). Of most importance are sections 1052(e) and (f) which prevent registration of
descriptive marks unless they have become distinctive of the applicant's goods (i.e. they have a
secondary meaning).
42. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982) ("The term 'trademark' includes any word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
others." Id.). See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119 ("This [provision) was a departure from
the past, as prior statutes only permitted registration of 'technical' common law trademarks."
Id.). See, e.g., In re World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (registra-
tion of candy bar wrapper allowed); In re Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836
(C.C.P.A. 1964) (registration of triangular shape of chemical permitted); Mogen David, 328
F.2d at 925 (registration of decanter wine container permitted); In re Swift & Co., 223 F.2d
950 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (registration of polka dot bands on packaging allowed).
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consumers."' Besides hindering attempts of palming-off, as discussed
above, the purpose of federal trademark registration also is to pro-
mote efficiencies in the marketplace. These efficiency justifications
can be divided into three categories: (1) to lower consumer search
costs; (2) to promote investment in goodwill; and (3) to impart infor-
mation through advertising.
The most important function a trademark serves is to allow a
customer who is satisfied by a product made by or under the direc-
tion of a particular manufacturer, to distinguish this product, with
minimal private and social costs, from similar goods made by other
manufacturers."' In a market environment with protectable trade-
marks, a consumer satisfied by a particular product who wishes to
again purchase the identical product from that same manufacturer,
can easily locate the product by finding its distinctive identifying
mark. Conversely, if products in the marketplace do not carry dis-
tinctive trademarks, then a satisfied consumer will have to engage in
various forms of "search" to locate the product made by the source
which previously pleased him.' 5 The consumer would have to incur
additional monetary and non-monetary costs to find the desired
product, and society would be required to devote more resources to
the search process." Thus, assuming that the trademark provides no
competitive advantages to its registrant, the net costs to society must
be lowered by protection through trademarks. For this reason, there
is little theoretical debate about the social utility of trademarks that
serve no other competitive function than to facilitate the consumers'
task of distinguishing the sources of products on the market.
A second fundamental function of trademarks is to maintain in-
centives for producers to manufacture quality merchandise."" A
43. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982).
44. The Senate Committee on Patents stated in the Report to Congress on the LanhamAct that one purpose underlying any trademark statute "is to protect the public so it may be
confident that in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark [sic] which it favorablyknows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get." S. REP. No. 1333, 79thCong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1274. SeeBurgunder, An Economic Approach to Trademark Genericism, 23 AM. Bus. L.J. 391, 392-94(1985).
45. The consumer, for instance, might search for the goods from the desired manufac-turer by questioning the retailers, tracing shipments from the manufacturer, or opening pack-
ages. Also, he may employ storage facilities to stockpile the goods, once found.46. See Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1336(1980). F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 326-
27 (1970); Burgunder, supra note 44, at 393.
47. See S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 44, at 1275 (The Senate Committee on Patents
stated: "Trade-marks [sic] encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the producerthe benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates. To protect trade-marks [sic], there,,
1986]
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trademark enables satisfied customers to continue their patronage
with the producer that pleased them. Thus, a manufacturer which
invests in superior marketing, manufacturing and quality control
techniques, and thereby fulfills the needs of particular customers, is
assured of their repeat business because the manufacturer's high
quality products are easy for consumers to distinguish from those of
competitors. 48 Obviously, however, if this manufacturer were not al-
lowed to monopolize a trade symbol, pleased customers would be
more likely to mistakenly purchase competitors' products, especially
when the search costs exceed the marginal value of that manufac-
turer's goodwill.' 9 Thus, the distinguishing feature of a trademark
serves to prevent "low-cost" imitators from appropriating a pro-
ducer's return on its investment in consistency and quality.50
A third, and more controversial, aspect of trademarks is their
tendency to serve advertising objectives.5" The advertising function of
trademarks can be divided into two components: information and
persuasion. 52 With respect to the information component, manufac-
turers attempt to use the advertising media to cause potential cus-
tomers to associate concrete information about a product (i.e. price,
source, quality, and characteristics) with the product's trademark. In
this way, manufacturers further facilitate the search process by load-
ing the trademark with information which otherwise could be ob-
fore, is . . .to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and goodwill by
preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who have not." Id.).
48. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 28 (2d ed. 1977).
49. Strictly speaking, "goodwill" is defined as those intangible business assets which
have not been accorded accounting recognition. M. GRANOF, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 384
(1977). Such assets include the good name of the firm, special skills of management, and an
advantageous location or economic environment. Id. In this context, goodwill specifically refers
to the reputation of the firm with regard to the quality and consistency of its products.
50. See S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 44, at 1274 (The Senate Committee on Patents
commented, "Where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time and money in presenting
to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from the misappropriation by pi-
rates and cheats." Id.). The return to the investing manufacturer may be lessened in two ways:
(1) purchasers desiring the manufacturer's products may buy from imitators instead, and (2)
dissatisfied purchasers of the imitators' inferior goods may attribute the reduced quality to the
investing manufacturer, thereby diminishing the desirability of its products.
51. See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942) ("A trade-mark [sic] is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to
select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants." Id.); Anti-Monopoly, Inc.
v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[Tirademarks become an
important medium of advertisement." Id.); 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 3:5; Lunsford,
Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Market Place (Part 1), 64
TRADE-MARK REP. 75, 78-79 (1974).
52. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57
YALE L.J. 1165 (1948).
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tained through search. Since the advertising function in the informa-
tional sense simply furthers the recognized legitimate economic
objectives of trademarks (reduction of search costs), there is no rea-
son to curtail this use."'
Besides employing advertising to transmit product information,
a manufacturer may use it to create an "aura" about its product. If
the trademark assimilates this aura, then the trademark may per-
suade consumers to purchase the product so that they may obtain
this attribute. For instance, assume that Cross Corporation creates a
sense of wealth and prestige in its advertisements for its pens. Due to
the advertisements, consumers may associate the prestigious image
with the Cross trademark, a top point in a color that contrasts with
the pen barrel color. Consumers might be persuaded to purchase
pens from Cross not solely for the functional quality which they be-
lieve Cross pens possess, but also to obtain the prestige imparted to
the pen by the trademark. In other words, a consumer might prefer
the Cross pen over a pen which is mechanically and physically (ex-
cept for its exterior color) identical, simply because of the prestigious
attribute associated with the mark.
The persuasion function adds a new dimension to the trade-
mark's traditional function of lowering search costs. Some scholars
argue that the creation of brand images simply shifts competition
from the mundane basis of price and quality differentials to a more
exciting plane."" Others retort that such product differentiation is ec-
onomically inefficient since it creates market power in the trademark
itself."5 No resolution to this general conflict is proposed here. How-
ever, in light of the Sears and Compco decisions to be discussed next,
it would be most inappropriate to protect product color trademarks
which successfully acquire a persuasive component.
In the companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co."
and Compo Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
53. See Bozen, New FTC Policy from Obsolete Economic Doctrine, 41 ANTITRUST L.J.477, 479 (1972) ("[Aldvertising is a productive and pro-competitive activity, substituting
cheaply provided information for expensive search costs, rather than being a wasteful activity
producing monopolistic results." Id.).
54. Spratling (Part I), supra note 13, at 458-60; Levitt, The Morality of Advertising,
HARV. Bus. REV., JULY-AUG., 1970, AT 84, 89-90.
55. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 52; MANN, ADVERTISING, CONCENTRATION, AND
PROFITABILITY: THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE AND DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (cited in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 137 (ed. H. Goldschmid, H. Marin &
J. Weston) (1974)).
56. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
57. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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analyzed the interplay between federal design patent laws and unfair
competition. In both of these cases, the defendants' copied certain
distinctive elements of the plaintiff's lighting fixtures and the plain-
tiffs brought suit for design patent infringement and unfair competi-
tion. The lower courts in each case found the design patents to be
invalid but upheld the unfair competition claims based on the sec-
ondary meaning attained by the designs of the fixtures. The Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court decisions on broad preemption
grounds. The Court stated:
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to pre-
vent the copying of an article which represents too slight an
advance to be patented would be to permit the State to block off
from the public something which federal law has said belongs to
the public. The result would be that while the federal law
grants only 14 or 17 years' protection to genuine inventions,
States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in
novelty to merit any patent at all under federal constitutional
standards. 6
Thus, the Court strongly announced that if a product design or attri-
bute is not entitled to a design patent or some other federal protec-
tion, it can be copied at will. 89 However, the Court did expressly
reserve to the states the power to require "those who make and sell
copies to take precautions to identify products as their own,"60 so
that consumers would not be misled as to the source of the
products. 1
The ramifications of these decisions on the continued viability of
state unfair competition laws has been heatedly debated. Similarly,
since the Lanham Act essentially embodies state unfair competition
doctrine, the impact of Sears and Compco on the federal act also has
been a subject of controversy.6" For example, it might be argued that
since the color "pink" is not sufficiently novel to achieve design pat-
ent protection, it cannot be monopolized by Owens-Corning for use
on insulation. At most, trademark laws could require any subsequent
user of "pink" on insulation to attach an identifying emblem to its
58. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32.
59. See Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
60. Id.
61. Ideal Toy, 685 F.2d at 81.
62. Cooper, supra note 21, at 16-22. See, e.g., Spratling (Part II), supra note 35; Aes-
thetic Production Features, supra note 21, at 354-59; Nonfunctional Product Features,
supra note 21, at 328-39; Ideal Toy, 685 F.2d at 81; S.K. & F. v. Premo Pharmaceutical
Laboratories, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980).
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pink product to distinguish it from that made by Owens-Corning.
Recent interpretations of these cases suggest that both state un-
fair competition laws and the Lanham Act remain intact, but subject
to restrictions on the potential scope of their protections."3 Only the
patent and copyright laws are designed to allow a producer to
achieve supranormal profits. However, such profits are permitted
only for a limited period of time. If trademarks also enabled their
holders to achieve supranormal profits, trademark holders would
have a lifetime economic benefit for designs which would be denied
protection, even for a limited time, by the patent laws. Thus, the
great weight of authority holds that a functional design cannot be
protected by trademarks, since the monopolization of such a design
would provide excess returns to the holder, and would reduce net
social welfare . 4 However, the clear implication from Sears and
Compco is that "functional" extends beyond utilitarian aspects to
any attribute of the trademark which the public values.65 If a prod-
uct design or color has any value to consumers other than as a means
to distinguish the sources of similar products, competitors should be
permitted to copy that design or color, subject only to a requirement
that they appropriately label their products.
This definition of "functional" casts doubt upon the appropri-
ateness of the persuasive advertising purpose of trademarks. If a
manufacturer succeeds in creating a mystique to its mark which con-
sumers covet in its own right, other manufacturers should be entitled
to copy that valuable item, because it is not protected by a patent.
This is especially true when the mark is a product color or design, as
opposed to a name, since the mark may have aesthetic or utilitarian
attributes for the consumer as well." Thus, even under the theory
that protection extends to persuasive attributes but not utilitarian
and aesthetic features, design marks which consumers value in their
own right must fall. This is because it would be impossible to deter-
63. See, e.g., Mogen David, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Honeywell, Inc., 497F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974); Truck Equipment Service Co. v.Fruehauf, 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 661 (1976); Teledyne Indus., Inc.
v. Windemere Products, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
64. See, e.g., Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120-22; Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1336-
37; Bose Corp., 772 F.2d at 866.
65. See Ideal Toy, 685 F.2d at 81 (citing S.K. & F., 625 F.2d at 1063) ("[A] feature ofgoods is considered non-functional if the element of the product serves no purpose other thanidentification." Id.); Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343 ("Functional in this sense might be said to
connote other than a trade-mark [sic] purpose." Id.).
66. See, e.g., Doeskin Products, Inc. v. Levinson, 132 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (pastel shades particularly appropriate for facial tissue); Deere & Co., 560 F. Supp. at
85 (green is functional for tractors because purchasers want their equipment to match).
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mine whether consumers were motivated by the potential utilitarian
and aesthetic attributes or by the persuasive attributes of the marks.
III. THE ECONOMIC DANGERS OF GENERIC PRODUCT COLOR
TRADEMARKS
The only legitimate role of trademarks is to foster efficiency in
market competition by allowing consumers to easily distinguish the
sources of similar goods. The philosophical underpinnings of Sears
and Compco instruct that trademarks are functioning inappropriately
if they permit their exclusive users to earn supranormal profits.
Thus, a trademark should not be granted registration, or registration
should be cancelled, whenever the trademark itself serves as a barrier
to, rather than as a facilitator of, competition.
A trademark may inhibit competition if the trademark enables
the trademark holder to lower the costs of production relative to
competitors or if the trademark permits its holder to attract addi-
tional demand because consumers value the mark in its own right.
These two restraints result when the trademark is functional and, as
mentioned previously, should not be tolerated in our current eco-
nomic system. A trademark also may restrain trade, however, if the
mark imparts valuable information about the product class that can-
not be transmitted to the consumer in other fashions at similar
costs."' Thus, there may be competitive problems not only when con-
sumers are attracted to particular aspects of a trademark, but also
when the mark serves as an indicator for the product class they seek.
This latter barrier to competition results when the trademark is ge-
neric or when it becomes generic through a doctrine called
genericide."
Although the competitive dangers of functional and generic
marks are similar, the problems arise from different forces.69 These
forces should be analyzed separately in order to develop a coherent
theoretical structure for solutions. However, courts often intermingle
functionality and "genericness" into the doctrine of functionality,
which creates inconsistencies and confusion.70 This article therefore
67. In this event, the trademark bestows valuable product information for which con-
sumers must search when considering competing products. Various characteristics of the mar-
ket and the product determine the likelihood that trade will be restrained by the trademark.
See Burgunder, supra note 44, at 400; Folsom & Teply, supra note 46, at 1334-46.
68. See supra notes 5 & 6.
69. See infra notes 75-81, 91-94 & 120-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the forces behind the competitive dangers from functional and generic marks.
70. See infra notes 85-86 & 116 and accompanying text.
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proceeds to distinguish the cases of generic color product marks from
functional marks, and to discuss the competitive dangers of each.
A. Initial Genericism
Although a number of articles have analyzed the economic con-
sequences of permitting registration of generic word marks, 7 1 little
has been written specifically with regard to generic color marks. Infact, there are relatively few instances of product colors that are ge-
neric prior to their trademark usages by particular companies.7 2
However, the principles used to consider the economic effects of ge-
neric word marks are readily transferable to generic product colors.
To illustrate the economic impact of generic product colors,
suppose the Lanham Act allowed registration of any product colors
which were not deceptively equivalent to colors already registered for
a similar product. In this event, a manufacturer would be inclined to
use a generic color, and quickly apply for trademark registration of
that color."8 Once the color were registered, the registrant would be
entitled to prohibit competitors not only from using that color on
similar goods, but also from employing colors that consumers could
not easily distinguish in a brief glance.74 For example, if a manufac-
turer of mint flavored mouthwash obtained a trademark registration
for the color "green," competitive manufacturers would have to use
other colors, such as red or yellow for their mint mouthwashes. In
this way, a consumer who desired a mint mouthwash would only
find one brand that appeared to contain mint flavoring, the brand of
the registered producer.
The registrant's exclusive appropriation of the generic color,
green, affords possible economic advantages over its competitors
71. See, e.g., Burgunder, supra note 44; Folsom & Teply, supra note 46; Note, Trade-
marks and Generic Words: An Effect-On-Competition Test, 51 U. CHi. L. REV. 868 (1984)[hereinafter cited as Effect-On-Competition Test].
72. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
73. A generic color can be defined as that color which consumers expect a product to be
no matter what company makes it. The Patent and Trademark Office in a few instances haspermitted the registration of generic terms. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brew-ing Co., 605 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980) (registration byMiller for "Lite" cancelled because it was generic before registration); Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
v. New York Air Lines, 559 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (registration of "shuttle" for
airline service was inappropriate).
74. One scholar argues that the average human observer can discriminate 125 hues, andthat protection from registration can be limited to each precise shade. Cooper, supra note 21,
at 22-25. However, whether this many shades may be distinguished under adverse shopping
conditions in which impulse buying behavior may be common is probably not clear.
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which may result in supranormal profits.75 For instance, first time
purchasers of mint mouthwash may buy the registrant's brand be-
cause it has the visual characteristics traditionally associated with the
flavor. Thus, the registrant may attract a disproportionate number of
new buyers at any price level not because of the product, but because
of the trademark. Also, customers investigating whether a retailer
has mint mouthwash in stock, or who purchase it over-the-counter,
may ask for green mouthwash rather than for mint mouthwash.
7
Consequently, the retailer may sell the registrant's brand when com-
petitor brands were less costly or equally desired. In addition, green
brand customers may be resistant to relative price changes between
their green brand and competitor brands. Consumers may be uncer-
tain of whether yellow or red mouthwashes, even labeled as mint
flavored, are in the same category of mint tasting products that they
associate with the green mint products. Thus, when the price of the
green brand rises relative to competitor prices, green brand custom-
ers may not consider whether red or yellow mouthwashes can be
produced with the same mint flavor as a green mouthwash. Rather
than engage in the extra search costs, they will simply pay the
higher price for the green brand. 7 Thus, the registrant may be able
to retain a disproportionate share of buyers which it would have lost
to competitors had they been able to color their brands green.
In economic terms, the first two effects noted above may cause
the demand curve facing the registrant to shift to the right while the
third phenomenon may cause it to become steeper. 8 When either
effect takes place, the demand curve is said to become more inelas-
tic,7 9 and as a consequence the registrant will earn higher profits
75. For thorough discussions of the advantages to registering generic trademarks, see
Burgunder, supra note 44; Folsom & Teply, supra note 46; Effect-On-Competition Test,
supra note 71.
76. See, e.g., Schmidt Mfg. Co. v. Sherrill Indus., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 480, 485
(W.D.N.C. 1965) (customers "were asking for green parts - not because they wanted
Schmidt's 'Polydur' - but because they were satisfied with the lasting qualities of high molec-
ular weight polyethylene." Id.).
77. For an excellent account of the effects of search costs on consumer behavior, see
Folsom & Teply, supra note 46, at 1334-46.
78. The demand curve illustrates the relationship between various price levels and con-
sumer demand for the product at each level. Formally, the demand curve for a specific com-
modity relates equilibrium quantities bought to the market price of the commodity, normal
money income and the nominal prices of the other commodities held constant. C.E. FERGUSON
& J.P. GOULD, supra note 10, at 45. The demand curve becomes "steeper" when a price
increase by the manufacturer results in a smaller drop in sales than before.
79. Inelasticity of demand is a measure of the product demand's resistance to substitutes.
That is, the lower the percentage change in quantity lost to substitutes when the price rises a
certain percentage amount, the greater is the inelasticity. C.E. FERGUSON & J.P. GOULD,
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than normally would be earned in an environment where competi-
tors could use the green color.80 In addition, if the demand curve
increased in inelasticity, there would be a reduction in net social wel-
fare. Less mouthwash ultimately would be sold at a price higher
than would be the case if the registrant had not been granted exclu-
sive use of the generic color.8" The danger in allowing registration of
a generic color, therefore, is that it may make the registrant's de-
mand curve more inelastic, thereby allowing price increases which
lead to supranormal profits and indirectly reduce the total welfare of
society.
The above discussion emphasizes that registration of generic
colors raises the possibility that the registrant will create a barrier to
competition, which benefits the producer at the expense of its com-
petitors and society. However, in actuality, this may not occur. New
mint mouthwash customers and veteran users of green mouthwash
may recognize that red or yellow mouthwash can be just as minty as
green mouthwash. Also, very few customers may request green
mouthwash orally or buy it over-the-counter. In this event, the ex-
clusive appropriation would cause no deleterious economic effects.82
However, it would be unfair to grant the registrant the opportunity
supra note 10, at 97. In formal terms, elasticity (or conversely, inelasticity) equals [-(Dq/q
divided by Dp/p)], in which "D" stands for "change in," "q" represents the quantity of com-
modity demanded, and "p" means the price of the good. Obviously when the demand curve
steepens, the equation results in a smaller number for elasticity, which is equivalent to saying
that inelasticity increases. This relationship is also true when the demand curve shifts. This is
because q increases while the other elements of the equation remain constant, thereby reducing
elasticity and increasing inelasticity.
80. Cf Folsom & Teply, supra note 46, at 1337 ("[The use of generic words as trade-
marks creates an entry barrier that enhances the ability of the firm holding the generic mark to
charge supra-competitive prices." Id.); C. GREEN, CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
AND POLICY 63-64 (1980) ("The steepness of the slope ... indicates the degree to which the
seller can raise prices without losing all of its customers. This ability reflects the seller's mar-
ket power . I. " Id.); D. ARMSTRONG, COMPETITION VERSUS MONOPOLY 96 (1982) ("In
order for a firm to have market power, it must have an inelastic demand for its product .
Id.).
81. Cf C.E. FERGUSON & J.P. GOULD, supra note 10, at 281-82.
82. Folsom & Teply, supra note 46, at 1353. Folsom and Teply consider certain market
characteristics in analyzing the susceptibility of the demand curve to become more inelastic
when a generic mark is appropriated:
(1) Whether the product possesses hidden performance characteristics;
(2) Opportunities for costless comparisons;
(3) The frequency of purchase and the cost of the product;(4) The availability of alternative colors and descriptors.
See also Burgunder, supra note 44, at 400; Note, Genericide: Cancellation of a Registered
Trademark, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 666, 674-78 (1983); Dougherty, Daw & Evans, Federal
Trade Commission v. Formica: The Generic Trademark Issue, 2 CoM. & THE LAW 1, 15
(1980).
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to earn supranormal profits simply because the manufacturer won a
race to the Patent and Trademark Office. Fortunately, the Lanham
Act has been interpreted to prohibit the registration of marks that
were generic before they were used in a trademark sense by an ap-
plicant. 88 This result comports with economic theory and should be
continued.
Although the number of litigated cases is somewhat limited,
businesses have been denied trademark protection for product colors
which were generic before the company's trademark usages of them.
For instance, Norwich Pharmacal Company was denied protection
for its pink stomach medicine, in part because the court believed that
consumers might be naturally predisposed to that color in stomach
medicine. This conclusion was based on evidence that at least 33
other stomach medicines had already been marketed with the pink
color.8 Similarly, the Coca-Cola Company was not permitted to mo-
nopolize a dark reddish brown color for cola.85 In analyzing this sit-
uation, the Fourth Circuit stated:
There are many cola drinks and all of them . . . are given the
same artificial dark reddish brown color . . . and since the pub-
lic has become accustomed to this appearance, a cola drink of a
different color would not be salable. The color of the drink,
therefore, is functional [and] may be used by all makers of cola
drinks.86
Here, the court correctly prevented protection, but did so by
calling the color "functional." Although there was some evidence
that the this color was slightly cheaper to produce because of the
caramel in the soda, the court was concentrating on the genericism
problem with the color. As indicated above, this form of blending of
the theoretically different problems of functionality and genericism is
typical.
In the Owens-Corning case, pink was not generic for fiberglass
83. No provision in the Lanham Act explicitly states that generic marks cannot be regis-
tered. However, the definition of "trademark" in the Act requires that the mark be able to
distinguish the goods of the applicant from those of other producers. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
Since a color that is generic before trademark usage applies to the entire range of goods in the
product class, it cannot serve to distinguish one source from another.
84. Norwich Pharmacal, 271 F.2d at 572-73. See also Schmidt Mfg., 249 F. Supp. at
485 (green associated with high molecular weight polyethylene for plastics).
85. Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories., Inc., 155 F.2d 59, 68 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 773 (1946) (defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known that the purchaser of its product intended to pass off the product as that of the Coca-
Cola Company).
86. Id. at 65.
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insulation prior to Owens-Corning trademark usage of the color.
Before Owens-Corning's sale of pink insulation, most customers
probably would have considered white-yellow, if any color, to be ge-
neric for insulation. Thus, it would be appropriate to prevent the
exclusive use of white-yellow due to genericism. Pink, however, was
not selected by Owens-Corning to capitalize on consumers' under-
standing as to the class of products it represents. The court correctly
pointed to evidence of the lack of initial genericism in its determina-
tion that pink could be registered by Owens-Corning. 7
B. Descriptive Marks and the Depletion Doctrine
The potential that registration of a trademark will create barri-
ers to competition is inversely related to the distinctiveness of the
mark. As described in the preceding section, a generic mark has a
high potential for causing market inefficiencies because it is the sym-
bol for an entire product class, rather than merely an indication of
the source of one product within the class. On the other hand, cus-
tomized marks88 are so unique that they can impart no other infor-
mation besides indicating source, and consequently are not likely to
cause market imperfections.
However, difficulty arises where the marks are descriptive of
the goods they represent. For word marks, these are the set of several
names by which a product accurately can be described.8 These
names have some potential for market danger because they may yield
information about the product itself, instead of merely providing in-
formation as to the source of the product. Thus, if the set of descrip-
tive names were sufficiently limited, those registering the descriptive
names would have an advantage over any competitor. The Lanham
Act allows registration of descriptive names only after it has been
determined that the word functions primarily as an indicator of
source, rather than as a descriptor of a particular product class (i.e.
it has secondary meaning). Under the Act, the applicant's exclusive
use of the mark for a period of five years is prima facie evidence of
secondary meaning."' This is sensible in economic terms, since other
sellers that truly need the designation to compete effectively would
employ it within the five year period.
Color marks cannot be descriptive of the goods they represent.
87. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122.
88. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
89. See, e.g., id.; 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 2, at § 74.4 (Supp. 1982).
90. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1982).
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However, since the set of basic color hues is limited,9' there may be
a potential for market inefficiencies, just as with descriptive marks.
Traditionally, courts have prohibited the registration of product col-
ors based on the concern that the entire color spectrum could become
depleted. 92 In this way, competitors might be foreclosed from any
color in which to sell their products. However, this blanket prohibi-
tion is too restrictive, given the extent of the colors available to the
market participants.9" Thus, rather than treating colors per se in the
same way as generic marks, it is much more appropriate to handle
them as descriptive marks. Therefore, companies attempting to regis-
ter single product colors should be permitted to do so, barring actual
genericism or functionality of the color, if the primary significance of
that color is to indicate the source of the product. Again, a five year
period of exclusive use should be prima facie evidence of such sec-
ondary meaning. This is the approach recently taken by the Federal
Circuit Court in Owens-Corning, and, in terms of color depletion, is
more suitable than a blanket refusal to register.94
C. The Potential for Color Genericide
A more acute problem with color marks is the potential that
they may become generic due to the ways in which companies use
them to represent their products. The difficulty here is not that the
color was generic before its trademark usage by a business, as with
green mouthwash, but that consumers associate an initially
nongeneric color with the product class due to use of the color by the
industry. This phenomenon informally has been called "genericide:"
91. There are only eight primary colors, including black and white. However, there are
virtually an unlimited number of hues between the primary colors on the color spectrum. Also,
hues may be altered through saturation and brightness. See Cooper, supra note 21, at 23-27.
Thus, the question of the extent of the relevant set of colors ultimately requires a determina-
tion of the human ability to readily distinguish the shades on the spectrum.
92. See, e.g., Campbell Soup, 175 F.2d at 798 ("If they may thus monopolize red in all
of its shades, the next manufacturer may monopolize orange in all its shades, and the next
yellow in the same way. Obviously, the list of colors will soon run out." Id.).
93. Approximately 125 hues in the spectrum may be discriminated by the average ob-
server, and as many as 200 steps of saturation may be seen for some hues. Cooper, supra note
21, at 23 (citing R.M. EVANs, AN INTRODUCTION TO COLOR 120 (1948)).
94. An associated question is when should color marks be considered sufficiently unique
that secondary meaning need not be proven. That is, the problem with single product colors is
that the range of possible alternatives is somewhat limited. However, bi-color usage raises the
possibilities by almost a power of two, and tri-color usage by almost a power of three. Thus,
there quickly becomes little danger that competitors will be unfairly disadvantaged. The au-
thor reserves this question for another study. However, it seems likely that tri-color and more
complex product designs should be afforded protection routinely, as long as those designs are
not generic to the product class or are functional.
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the death of a once valid trademark because it has become generic. 5
Under section 1064(c) of the Lanham Act, a trademark consisting of
a name has no more right to protection when genericide occurs as
when the mark is initially generic.96 Thus, even a registered name
trademark can be lost under the Act if consumers begin to associate
the mark with a particular product class. 97 This doctrine is economi-
cally sensible, if applied correctly, because a mark that becomes ge-
neric, like a symbol that was initially generic, may create the barri-
ers to competition previously outlined. This is as true with color
marks as it is with word marks. Therefore, section 1064(c) of the
Lanham Act should be clarified to include color marks to ensure that
courts do not, in applying the genericide doctrine, distinguish them
from word marks.9
Courts have more difficulty dealing with genericide cases than
with cases in which the marks were initially generic. In initial
genericism cases, manufacturers essentially race to the Patent and
Trademark Office to appropriate generic symbols which ultimately
may bring them an unfair advantage. Since these producers are at-
tempting to earn supranormal profits without incurring any proper
investment costs, it makes sense to nip them in the bud and un-
hesitatingly deny protection.99 However, in genericide cases, produc-
95. Some persons only use the term "genericide" to apply to registered marks which
have become generic. However, the economic problems associated with unregistered marks that
lose their distinctiveness are no different than those created by registered marks. Thus, in this
article, "genericide" refers to any registered or unregistered color scheme which becomes ge-
neric after its employment as a trademark by a firm. Note that as the registration of colors
becomes more widespread, the number of situations in which registered product colors become
generic will increase. Among the more notable fatalities of genericide are the following: Anti-
Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983) ("Monopoly"); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co.,
343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965) ("Yo-Yo"); King-Seely Thermos v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) ("Thermos"); Bayer, Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y.
1921) ("Aspirin"); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745
(S.D. Iowa 1961) ("Trampoline"); Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
80 (Comm. Pat. 1950) ("Escalator").
96. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982) (provides that a petition to cancel a mark
may be filed "at any time if the registered mark becomes the common descriptive name of an
article or substance .. " Id.).
97. Most courts use the primary significance test in genericide cases. See Comment, Ge-
neric Term or Trademark?: Confusing Legal Standards and Inadequate Protection, 29 AM.
U.L. REV. 109 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Confusing Legal Standards).
98. Currently, section 1064(c) specifically applies only to registered marks that have
become generic names of articles. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982). See supra note
96.
99. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co., 605 F.2d at 990 (trademark protection for "Lite"
denied because the term was generic for low calorie beer before its use by Miller); Eastern Air
Lines, 559 F. Supp. at 1270 (trademark protection for "shuttle" denied because the term was
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ers initially select marks based on their distinguishing characteristics
but over time lose control of these marks because consumers begin to
associate them with the product class rather than with the particular
manufacturer. Courts are understandably uneasy about cancelling
marks, such as Kleenex, because such cancellation would strip the
owner's goodwill in the mark even when the potential dangers from
the mark are not a result of unfair intentions.
Since genericide involves occurrences in which sizable invest-
ments have been made in promoting a distinctive mark, the doctrine
only should deny protection when the mark has actually caused the
product's demand curve to lose elasticity.1"' Therefore, the proper
inquiry requires a direct investigation into the economic impact on
demand elasticity that is created by the exclusive use of the mark.
Instead of directly testing economic effects, however, courts use
troubling semantic tests of consumer understanding to consider possi-
ble genericide cases involving both names and colors.'01
Courts often use surveys to determine if trade symbols consist-
ing of names have become generic. The problem is that a symbol has
a greater or lesser chance of protection depending upon which type
of survey the court relies.' 0 2 Also, each type of survey has been
deemed deficient by courts and/or the United States Congress. For
instance, to investigate genericism, some courts rely on surveys which
ask consumers what they call the product.' 03 This approach has been
criticized because consumers' responses may not accurately reflect
whether they recognize the particular name to be an indication of
source rather than being generic to the product class.10 4 Another
popular form of survey provides examples of brand names and ge-
generic for transit before its use by Eastern); Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 ("Safari"
generic clothing before its use by Abercrombie & Fitch); Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941) ("cola" generic before its use by Coca-Cola).
100. Use of a generic mark only creates the possibility of market power. See supra notes
81-82 and accompanying text. In genericide cases, given that there are legitimate investments
in establishing the mark, it is only proper to deny protection if market power actually materi-
alizes. Burgunder, supra note 44, at 412-13.
101. See, e.g., Folsom & Teply, supra note 46; Burgunder, supra note 44; Effect-On-
Competition Test, supra note 71; Zeisel, The Surveys that Broke Monopoly, 50 U. CH. L.
REV. 896 (1983); Confusing Legal Standards, supra note 97.
102. Leiser & Schwartz, Techniques for Ascertaining Whether a Term is Generic, 73
TRADE-MARK REP. 376, 380, 384 (1983).
103. See, e.g., Donald F. Duncan, 343 F.2d at 655; Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic
Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437 (D. Or. 1978); Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants &
Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
104. Burgunder, supra note 44, at 408. See, e.g., E. 1. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Hershey Foods Corp. v. Cerreta, 195
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 246 (T.M.T. & App. Bd. 1977).
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neric names, and then asks respondents to categorize the disputed
name.' Again, this form of survey has been criticized by various
courts, especially when the product has been made by only one com-
pany.'0 6 One court, due in part to frustrations with the above defi-
ciencies, relied on a survey based on customers' purchase motiva-
tions.'1 7 This test was so inappropriate, however, that Congress
amended the Lanham Act to explicitly forbid its use.' 8
The Federal Circuit in Owens-Corning slipped into the same
trap of considering inappropriate survey evidence in evaluating
whether the color "pink" should by protected by the Lanham Act.' 09
Here, consumers were asked, "What manufacturer makes pink insu-
lation?" The court was impressed that 41% stated Owens-Corning
while 14% gave some other names. Even more persuasive, the court
believed, was evidence that the percentage rose to 50% after an
Owens-Corning advertising blitz." 0 The remarkable deficiency in
this survey is that customers may have been offering the name of the
insulation manufacturer that was simply most well-known to them.
In this way, the key aspect of the survey, whether the manufacturer
sells pink insulation, may have been irrelevant to the respondents.
Moreover, in terms of name recognition alone, one would expect
more respondents to recall the Owens-Corning name in relation to
insulation after an advertising blitz. Had another manufacturer just
completed a similar campaign, even for non-pink insulation, the re-
sults may have been quite different.
In addition to survey evidence, courts often review other forms
of evidence to determine whether a mark continues to indicate the
source of a particular product, or whether it has become generic to
the product class."' One form of such evidence is the manner in
105. See, e.g., Yoshida, 393 F. Supp. at 502.
106. See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, 684 F.2d at 1323; Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester's Mkt.,
Inc., 571 F. Supp. 763, 775 (D. Conn. 1983), vacated, 756 F.2d 280 (2nd Cir.), vacated, 609
F. Supp. 588 (D.C. Conn. 1985).
107. Anti-Monopoly, 684 F.2d at 1324-25.
108. Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, PUB. L. No. 98-620, § 102, 98 Stat. 3335
(1984) ("The primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather than
purchaser motivation shall be the test. ... Id.).
109. See also Ideal Toy, 685 F.2d at 82 (in arguing for secondary meaning, the court
found that an "imitation' cube puzzle was called a Rubik's cube by 40% of respondents).
110. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1127.
111. The following are some of the indirect proxies used by courts in genericide cases:
(1) Whether the name is promoted as a noun rather than as an adjective. See, e.g.,
Nestle, 571 F. Supp. at 778 (Nestle's promotion of the product as Toll House cookies rather
than Toll House chocolate chip cookies is indicative of product significance.).
(2) Whether the name is used generically in publications. See, e.g., Dan Robbins &
Assocs., Inc. v. Questor Corp., 599 F.2d 1009, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 1979); Abercrombie & Fitch,
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which the mark is advertised. For instance, in cases involving name
trademarks, advertising which promotes the name as a product class
is proof of genericide. Thus, a campaign telling consumers to "buy
Sanka" or "use a Xerox" would be considered probative that the
mark had become associated with a product class.112
In Owens-Corning, the court investigated advertising to deter-
mine if the "descriptive" pink color had acquired sufficient second-
ary meaning to be eligible for trademark registration. Although im-
pressed by the volume of advertising generated by Owens-Corning to
promote its pink insulation,"1 ' the court did not explore the content
of that advertising to the extent considered necessary in genericide
cases. Examples of advertising slogans were:
*Put your house in the pink.
*Add another layer of pink.
*Think pink, buy pink, install pink.
*Beat the cold with pink." 4
This is precisely the form of product class advertising which is
deemed inappropriate in genericide cases, and yet the court con-
cluded it was a positive indication of registrability. Indeed, the court
took notice of the fact that a retailer reported that "some shoppers
will no longer buy fiberglass insulation unless it is pink," but the
court then ignored it. 15 Clearly, the court did not suitably distin-
guish the different issues that are relevant to product color
registration.
Similarly, courts have reached inconsistent conclusions with re-
gard to product color cases involving drugs because they incorrectly
analyze them in terms of functionality."' The danger in drug cases,
537 F.2d at 11; Nestle, 571 F. Supp. at 778.
(3) Whether there are reasonable alternative marks. See, e.g., Dictaphone, 199
U.S.P.Q. at 447; Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952),
affd, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
(4) Whether the mark is in the dictionary with a product significance definition. See,
e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80-81 (7th Cir. 1977);
Nestle, 571 F. Supp. at 777.
112. See supra note 111.
113. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125, 1127 (Owens-Corning spent more than $42
million on advertising.).
114. Id. at 1126-27.
115. Id. at 1126. James Fulton, a consultant design director for Owens-Corning erred
similarly when he stated in the Wall Street Journal that color "can be a major advantage in
making a company's product unique." Pink is Taken; But a Few Hues are Left, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 14, 1986, at 33, col. 3.
116. Compare Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
affd, 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979), remand opn. rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 538 (2d
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generally, is not that consumers prefer a particular tablet because
they are naturally attracted to the pleasing color of that tablet. In-
stead, the typical scenario is one in which consumers become accus-
tomed to a drug having a certain color configuration during the pe-
riod in which one company, which holds a patent on the drug,
continually sells the drug with that configuration. When the patent
expires, companies manufacturing generic substitutes claim that it is
difficult for them to sell their products unless they can employ the
color configuration which consumers have come to associate with the
medication. Competitors feel disadvantaged if forced to use other col-
ors on their drug products because customers may be unsure that
such medications are in the same product class as the previously pat-
ented medication. This is a classic genericide situation and should be
treated as such.
Given that the genericide issue often arises in product color
cases, courts must choose the best means to investigate the economic
dangers of a mark that allegedly has become generic. As previously
mentioned, most semantic tests currently used by courts are deficient
in this pursuit. Instead, recent scholarly opinions advocate focusing
attention on whether the mark has allowed the user to achieve
supranormal profits. 117 Thus, one should investigate whether the ex-
clusive right to the mark has caused the demand curve facing the
user to lose elasticity. In a previous article, this author advocated
that courts analyze the market power that the trademark user has
derived from its exclusive right to a name mark, and specifically sug-
gested one direct means to undertake this investigation.' 8 This test,
discussed in section V below, is appropriate for considering the dan-
gers from both product color genericness and functionality.
IV. THE FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE AND PRODUCT COLOR
TRADEMARKS
With few exceptions, courts will not protect a trademark if it is
Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.
841 (1982) (capsule color is functional because elderly patients may associate the color with
efficacy, some patients rely on color to distinguish between medications, and color may have a
role in the identification of drugs in emergency situations) with S.K. & F. Co., 625 F.2d at
1064 (the capsule color was not so related to the product's use as to be functional since the
color had "nothing to do with the purpose or performance of the drug or with its processing."
Id.).
117. See, e.g.. Burgunder, supra note 44; Folsom & Teply, supra note 46; Effect-On-
Competition Test, supra note 71.
118. Burgunder, supra note 44, at 411-16.
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functional.'" Unfortunately, this is the only matter of consistency
among the circuit courts. Most courts have lost sight of the purpose
of the functionality doctrine, and consequently have blended many
diverse and often inappropriate concepts into the doctrine. As men-
tioned before, courts often misapply genericism concepts by constru-
ing them in functional terms. Moreover, courts have started to ana-
lyze cases based on a dubious distinction between utilitarian and
aesthetic functionality. The result has been a serious state of confu-
sion in this realm of trademark law. This section, therefore, strives
to clearly delineate and define the proper subjects of a functionality
analysis.
A. Economic Considerations of Supply Functionality
As explained above, the sole purpose of a trademark is to lower
the search costs for consumers by enabling them to easily distinguish
between similar goods or services. According to the philosophy of
Sears and Compco, a mark cannot be protected if it allows its exclu-
sive user to appropriate supranormal profits. 2 The investigation of
functionality, therefore, as with generic marks, should focus on
whether the mark is enabling its owner to reap such supranormal
profits.
Although courts often fail to coherently make the distinction,
functionality can apply in either a supply sense or a demand
sense.1 ' In terms of supply, a trademark would be functionally
troublesome if it allowed the holder to manufacture the product more
cheaply than could competitors.12 2 In this event, the market price,
which is a function of the competitors' cost, would exceed the regis-
trant's cost level. Thus, supranormal profits would be achieved. Fur-
thermore, since the trademark is a legally protected monopoly, these
supranormal profits would be resistant to normal competitive re-
119. See supra note 3. But see National Football League Properties, Inc., v. Wichita
Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 663 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (even though a feature is
functional, it may be protected as a trademark if it has acquired secondary meaning).
120. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1341 (the issue of functionality depends on
the superiority of the design in light of the costs of manufacture).
122. Most tests of functionality recognize that the costs to manufacture the article are
relevant. See, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850-51 n.10 (1982)
("In general terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the user or purpose of the
article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article." Id.); Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at
1341; Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn.
1971), affd, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972) (functionality exists because other bicycle rim de-
signs are more complex and more expensive).
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sponses and thus would be maintained in the long-term.12
In the product color arena, there are a few instances in which
trademark protection might lead to supra normal profits as a result of
its impact on the cost of manufacture. If the protected color is the
product's naturally occurring color, competitors must incur extra ex-
penses to add new colors to their products. For instance, if the Coca-
Cola Company were permitted to register the color "reddish-brown"
for its cola beverages, then it might earn supranormal profits since
cola is naturally this color due to the effect of caramel in the ingredi-
ent mix.1"4 Other companies, to sell cola, would then be forced to
incur the extra costs of including color additives." 5 Similarly, in the
Owens-Corning factual setting, it would be inappropriate to protect
white-yellow as a trademark for fiberglass insulation, even if con-
sumers did not recognize this color as a generic designation for the
product, since this is the natural state of the product. Given that
Owens-Corning added the color pink to the natural white-yellow
color, its mark is not functional in terms of supply.
A product color also may be supply functional if that color or
combination of colors is less expensive to apply to the product than
are alternative colors. These costs may be a function of the cost of
materials or the cost of reproducing the design. Thus, if consumers
prefer a particular set of colors or designs over others, a company
which legally appropriates a monopoly on the cheapest color or de-
sign in this set would have a competitive advantage and could earn
supranormal profits.12 6 In the Owens-Corning case, no evidence was
offered to show that pink insulation was somehow cheaper to manu-
facture than insulation dyed in alternative colors.12 7 Thus, supply
123. In a freely competitive environment, businesses will enter an industry yielding
supranormal profits in order to obtain the above normal profits. In the long-term, the entry of
these firms, and the competitive downward pressures on price which result from the additional
supply produced, will reduce the supranormal profits to normal profits. If entry is restricted,
however, such as by a legally protected functional trademark, then the supranormal profits can
be sustained in the long term.
124. Coca-Cola Co., 155 F.2d at 59.
125. See also William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924) (no
protection afforded to the color "brown" for quinine because of the presence of chocolate as a
masking agent and suspension medium).
126. See, e.g., Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1341.
127. In fact, Owens-Corning was one of the only manufacturers to dye its product.
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122. Thus, there was little opportunity to perceive whether
there existed a set of colors which consumers preferred over the natural color, white-yellow.
The court seems to presume that if consumers preferred dyed insulation in general, other
companies would apply colors to their products to attract customers. Id. (The court approved
the following statement by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board: "[There is no evidence in
this record of widespread industry practice of dying fibrous glass insulation a color different
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functionality was not a factor in these proceedings.
As long as the issue of supply functionality is properly sepa-
rated from demand functionality considerations, it is relatively easy
to apply. Only documentary evidence with regard to the costs of
manufacture is necessary for an economic analysis of supply func-
tionality. Thus, the courts need not rely on customer surveys or other
complicated forms of evidence to analyze the potential economic
problems associated with the supply functionality of marks. Obvi-
ously, if the existence of supply functionality is established, then the
inquiry is at an end. Therefore, the direct test of demand functional-
ity, presented in section IV, is based on the assumption that there is
no problem with supply functionality.
B. Economic Considerations of Demand Functionality
A trademark may be functional when consumers are induced to
buy the represented product, at least in part, to obtain the trademark
itself. That is, a trademark is functional in the demand sense when
consumers attach some value to the trademark other than merely
considering it a vehicle to aid in the search process. This value may
be associated with certain utilitarian aspects of the trademark design,
or may reflect certain psychological preferences for it. In either case,
demand for the product is contingent, to some degree, upon the phys-
ical attachment of the trademark to the product.
Trademarks which are functional in a demand sense are eco-
nomically inefficient because they enable their holders to earn supra-
normal profits. When the trademark is valued in its own right, con-
sumers will be willing to spend more for the product upon which it
is displayed than they would spend for that same product without
the valued mark. In economic terms, this means that the trademark
will cause the demand curve facing the exclusive holder to shift128
and in turn become more inelastic.'29 Since competitors have no ac-
cess to the valuable trademark, the demand curve shift will result in
from that which it has as a result of the manufacturing process, nor is there anything in the
record suggesting a need to do so." Id.) This is probably reasonable. However, if indeed pink
insulation were cheaper to make than green or blue insulation, a further investigation should
be made into whether consumers preferred dyed insulation to natural insulation. Also, be
aware that no investigation has been made, as yet in this article, into the question of whether
customers prefer pink insulation, in specific, to all other colors of insulation.
128. Assuming that customers are willing to pay more for the additional value imbedded
in the product by the trademark, the demand curve relationship between price and quantity
sold will shift higher (and to the right) on the axis to reflect the higher price that will be paid
for each unit sold.
129. See supra note 79.
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relatively higher profits for the holder which will be sustainable in
the long-term. In light of Sears and Compco, such a result conflicts
with the purpose of the patent systems, and thus should not be toler-
ated. Therefore, when a trademark has demand functionality in that
it causes the demand curve facing its user to increase in inelasticity,
that mark should be free for all competitors to copy.
The definitive court examination of the doctrine of demand
functionality came in In Re Morton-Norwich Products Co.130 The
Morton-Norwich case involved the trademark registration of a plastic
spray bottle design. Judge Rich, writing for the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, correctly perceived that the ultimate determina-
tion of functionality must be made "in light of competition.""1 '
However, the court erroneously focused on the competitive necessity
that the design be universally available, rather than on the inappro-
priate advantages which the trademark design might bestow upon its
holder. 3 2 Following this philosophy, the court stated that a design is
not protectable as a trademark if it enables the product to perform its
utilitarian functions in a way that is superior to designs available to
competitors.' With regard to the facts before it, the court concluded
that there were an infinite variety of spray bottle forms which were
equally suitable to perform the function of discharging liquid ingre-
dients." 4 Thus, competitors would not be unduly hindered in com-
petition if restricted from copying the design in question.
The problem with this approach is that it reformulates the right
of product imitation. No longer are competitors entitled to copy ideas
freely unless they are protected by a patent. Now, an idea may be
exclusively appropriated as long as competitors can survive without
using it. In other words, supranormal profits can be tolerated as long
as they do not turn into monopoly profits. Moreover, the court is
forced to make conclusory statements about the superiority of design
functions.'38 The fact that many forms of containers can discharge
liquid spray does not mean that they are necessarily equivalent.
Consumers may, because of shape, size, or other aesthetic reasons,
130. 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
131. Id. at 1339.
132. Id. at 1340 ("[W]e should examine whether prohibition of imitation by others will
'deprive them of something which will substantially hinder them in competition.'" Id. (cita-
tions omitted)).
133. Id. at 1341-42.
134. Id. at 1342.
135. For a contrasting example, see In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d at 866, where the Fed-
eral Circuit agreed with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that Bose's pentagonal base
shape was a design superior to possible alternatives.
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consider one design to be superior to others. Yet, the court ignored
this important aspect of demand, and instead focused on the ability
of competitors to supply spray bottles at equivalent costs. In effect,
the court confused the concepts of supply and demand functionality.
The court in Morton-Norwich, in addition, erroneously sug-
gested that demand functionality in the aesthetic realm should some-
how be analyzed distinctly, if at all, from demand functionality based
on utilitarian advantages.186 The two areas, however, are intimately
interrelated and must be analyzed together in every case. Thus, in
investigating a design's effect on inelasticity, a simultaneous determi-
nation of whether consumers prefer the way the design works and
looks must be made. To focus on one and to ignore the other is to
open a "Pandora's Box" of competitive advantages.
Other courts similarly have focused on the utilitarian aspects of
a trademark in determining functionality. For instance, in the Sec-
ond Circuit, functionality is defined as a feature that is "essential to
the use or purpose of the article" or that affects "the cost or quality
of the article.. 1 7 Further, as explained by a New York district
court, a design feature is essential only if it "is dictated by the func-
tions to be performed," and a design feature affects the cost or qual-
ity of the article if it "permits the article to be manufactured at a
lower cost . . . or constitutes an improvement in the operation of the
goods."' 88 Likewise, the Third Circuit approaches functionality
solely from a utilitarian perspective. In Keene Corp. v. Paraflex In-
dustries, the court stated, "the inquiry should focus on the extent to
which the design feature is related to the utilitarian function of the
product or feature. When the design itself is not significantly related
to the utilitarian function of the product, but is merely arbitrary,
then it is entitled to protection. . . ." " These approaches are too
permissive because they ignore the potential effects that aesthetics
may have upon consumer demand. As a .consequence, a company
may be allowed to appropriate a design which is valuable to consum-
ers, but is not an appropriate subject for trademark protection.
Other courts have recognized the possible detrimental competi-
136. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1338 n.1 (functional means utilitarian in cases in-
volving "utilitarian functionality" and not "aesthetic functionality").
137. LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1985).
138. Metro Kane Imports Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
139. 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A
Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 692 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (decorative automobile grill and hood
held to be non-functional because they were not primarily utilitarian). See generally Aesthetic
Production Features, supra note 21, at 365.
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tive impact of aesthetic demand functionality. For instance, the
Eighth Circuit set the groundwork for aesthetic functionality by not-
ing that a rounded corner bib pocket design on overalls may be func-
tional if it contributes materially to the salability or commercial suc-
cess of the product. 40 Soon thereafter, in Pagliero v. Wallace China
Co., the Ninth Circuit refused to protect a floral design pattern of
china because the attractiveness and eye-appeal of the design sold the
china. " Specifically, the Ninth Circuit espoused a correct formula-
tion of the functionality doctrine:
"Functional" in this sense might be said to connote other than a
trade-mark [sic] purpose. If the particular feature is an impor-
tant ingredient in the commercial success of the product, the in-
terest in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of
a patent or copyright. On the other hand, where the feature or,
more aptly, design, is a mere arbitrary embellishment, a form of
dress for the goods primarily adopted for purposes of identifica-
tion and individuality and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer
demands in connection with the product, imitation may be
forbidden .. 142
This standard, although theoretically on point, suffers from certain
problems in application. First, the trademark may contribute to the
commercial success of a product by performing its appropriate func-
tion - clearly designating the producer that patrons want.' The
standard, however, does not provide guidelines on how to factor out
this effect on demand. Related to this is a concern that the standard
is too subjective."' How should a court approach the question of
whether consumers are drawn to a manufacturer's product by the
aesthetic dimensions of its mark? Often this attraction is psychologi-
cal and thus cannot be pinpointed easily with consumer survey ques-
140. J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941).
141. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
142. Id. at 343 (footnotes omitted).
143. See, e.g., Aesthetic Production Features, supra note 21, at 365, and cases cited
therein.
144. See, e.g., Vuitton et Fils, 644 F.2d at 774 ("It is almost tautological to say that any
inquiry into aesthetics requires a search for subjective impulses, difficult to quantify or spec-
ify." Id.); 3 R. CAI.LMANN, supra note 2, at § 77.4(e)(1).
Unless the concept of functionality is limited to those features which clearly
affect the process of manufacture or the mechanics of use, there is a danger of
losing all distinction between functional and non-functional features. The dis-
tinction becomes especially meaningless when we label as functional any feature
that contributes to consumer appeal. . ..
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tions.' 4 5 In addition, some courts and scholars have difficulties with
the standard in dealing with possible prestige effects of the design.'" 6
For instance, in Vuitton et Fils v. J. Young Enterprises, the circuit
court was disturbed that consumers might be attracted to luggage
with a design using the letters "LV" because of the prestige associ-
ated with those letters.4 7 If the court is concentrating on the prestige
connected with the ownership of quality merchandise from a particu-
lar manufacturer, then its concern is valid. In this light, the problem
that source designation may lead to commercial success reoccurs.
However, if the court intends to protect a cachet attached to the
mark independent of the manufacturer, its concerns may be mis-
guided. As previously stated, the persuasive effects of advertising
have dubious social utility with respect to trademarks and may not
be suitable for trademark protection.
The Pagliero standard appropriately recognizes that the only
role of trademarks is to assist consumers in differentiating the
sources of similar products. Thus, any other attraction that consum-
ers have to the trademark, whether it is for utilitarian or aesthetic
reasons, is inappropriate. What is required then, is a means to dis-
tinguish the situations in which the trademark correctly serves the
source denoting function, from the occasions in which the mark per-
forms inappropriately. Techniques must be devised to investigate
whether the existence of a particular mark affects demand for its
represented product in a way that permits the manufacturer to enjoy
supranormal profits. One such technique is suggested in section V.
Before proceeding to this proposal, however, this article will review
how the Owens-Corning court's focus solely on the utilitarian attrib-
utes of pink insulation overlooked an important functional aspect of
the product. I
The Owens-Corning court correctly found there were no utilita-
rian reasons for customers to prefer pink fiberglass insulation.'14 No
evidence was proffered that indicated the pink color retained heat
better than other colors. Alternatively, there was no evidence that
pink was more useful to customers because it somehow coordinated
better with house colors. In this way the case was different from
Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., in which customers preferred green
145. See, e.g., Norwich Pharmacal Co., 271 F.2d at 572-73; Gillette Safety Razor Co.
v. Triangle Mechanical Labs Corp., 4 F. Supp. 319, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); Cooper, supra
note 21, at 12-14.
146. See, e.g., Aesthetic Production Features, supra note 21, at 365.
147. Vuitton et Fils, 644 F.2d at 774.
148. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1121.
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tractors because they matched other pieces of farm equipment.14 9
However, the Owens-Corning court did not investigate the possibility
that consumers might be drawn to pink insulation for reasons unre-
lated to utility. For example, consumers might be attracted to pink
insulation due to some psychological belief that the color pink is
warmer, and therefore would enhance the effectiveness of insulation.
If this were the case, competitors deprived of this color would be
forced to find ways to overcome the psychological preference for pink
insulation, which obviously puts them at a competitive disadvantage.
Color psychology is recognized by marketers as an important
tool to attract customers, and its effects are under intense scrutiny by
organizations such as the Color Marketing Group.15 Courts have
acknowledged the possible unfair advantage such innate psychologi-
cal consumer tendencies might bring to the manufacturer given ex-
clusive access to a product color.' For instance, the color blue has
been considered psychologically relevant to razor blades, and pink
has been hypothesized to be psychosomatically therapeutic in the
treatment of upset stomachs."' Likewise, the possible psychological
effects of the color pink in the insulation industry should have been
analyzed. The fact that this aspect was ignored is another clear defi-
ciency in the Owens-Corning opinion.
V. AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO PRODUCT COLOR TRADEMARK
REGISTRATION
The two most difficult issues encountered in product color
trademark registration concern the possible genericide of the color as
applied to a product, and the possible functionality of the color in
terms of consumer demand. Currently, courts either overlook the
genericide issue altogether, or rely upon defective survey approaches
in scrutinizing genericide. As previously mentioned, the focus with
regard to genericide should be on how exclusive rights to a product
color impact the elasticity of that product's demand curve. If the de-
mand curve is more inelastic solely because a manufacturer appro-
priates a particular color, competitors should also be allowed to use
that color on their products. Similarly, if a color is functional from a
demand perspective, a company with exclusive rights to that color
will gain a competitive advantage. Again, the deleterious effect on
149. 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), afd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
150. See Wall Street Journal, supra note 115.
151. See Cooper, supra note 21, at 12-14, and cases cited therein.
152. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 271 F.2d at 572-73; Gillette, 4 F. Supp. at 322.
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competition results when the legally protected functional color in-
creases the inelasticity of the trademark holder's demand curve.
Thus, the problem for both scenarios is the same: a firm that enjoys
unfair competition or federal registration protection of a color will
unfairly earn supranormal profits when such protection increases the
inelasticity of that firm's demand curve. Therefore, a legal test which
considers the effect of product color protection on the demand curve's
elasticity will uncover wrongful applications of that color, whether
they result from genericism constraints or demand functionality.
The relevant inquiry in product color protection cases is
whether the demand curve of the product in question is more inelas-
tic than it would be if the product color were not applied exclusively
by this manufacturer on its product. One means of approaching this
inquiry, which has frequently been used in antitrust cases, is to ex-
amine the cross-elasticity of demand between the subject product and
competitor products.1 58 Since cross-elasticity of demand is a measure
of the substitutability of competitive items, it follows that as cross-
elasticity between the subject product and other goods decreases, the
inelasticity of the subject product's demand curve increases. 5"
Therefore, if the cross-elasticity of demandl is lower when a firm has
exclusive use of a color than it would be if competitors were permit-
ted to employ that color on their products, then the color itself serves
as a barrier to competition which, in turn, enables an exclusive user
to enjoy supranormal profits. Since the trademark system is not
designed to protect supranormal profits, a product color should be
freely available under these circumstances.
For the Owens-Corning fact situation, one might directly test
the effect of the product color, pink, upon Owens-Corning's demand
elasticity in the following manner.' 55 First, design a typical market
scenario consisting of Owens-Corning's fiberglass insulation and
other competitive brands of insulation, colored in shades other than
153. The price cross-elasticity of demand is the proportional change in the quantity
demanded of one particular good resulting from a given change in the price of a different
related good. C.E. FERGUSON & J.P. GOULD, supra note 10, at 63. Cross-elasticity of demand
is employed by courts to aid in determinations of the scope of product markets in antitrust
cases. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956);
Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). One author has suggested that cross-
elasticity analysis be used to determine the relevant product market in trademark genericism
cases. Effect-On-Competition Test, supra note 71, at 884-85. In addition, a thorough proposal
to use cross-elasticity of demand in name genericide cases was outlined in Burgunder, supra
note 44, at 411-16.
154. See, e.g., C.E. FERGUSON & J.P. GOULD, supra note 10, at 62-63, 96-104.
155. For a complete discussion of this test in the context of registered name trademarks,
see Burgunder, supra note 44, at 411-16.
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pink. Each brand of insulation should bear, or otherwise be identi-
fied by, a technical mark consisting of a name or a symbol. Then,
select a sample of persons who potentially may purchase fiberglass
insulation." Next, determine the cross-elasticity of demand by low-
ering the relative prices of the competitive products and analyzing
the demand shifts for the sample participants.1 57 Presumably, de-
mand for the competitive products will increase as their prices be-
come more attractive in relation to pink insulation.
After this analysis, reconstruct the market environment so that
all the insulation brands are colored pink. Again, each brand of in-
sulation should be identified by a technical mark. Now, gather a new
sample of persons who want, or someday may want, fiberglass insu-
lation. Inform sample participants who have seen or heard about
pink insulation before, that the pink insulation bearing the Owens-
Corning technical mark in the market setting, is that pink brand
with which they are familiar. This will prevent a person who specif-
ically wants Owens-Corning insulation, but only recognizes it by its
pink color, from purchasing competitor products by mistake. As
before, the cross-elasticity of demand should then be determined by
lowering the relative prices of the competitive pink insulation prod-
ucts, and noting the changes in demand for Owens-Corning's brand
of pink insulation.
If the cross-elasticity of demand increases with statistical signifi-
cance in the second scenario, the pink product color itself is serving
to segregate the markets, and to increase the inelasticity of the de-
mand curve facing Owens-Corning. This is true because consumer
confusion is controlled, and all other variables in the scenario other
than product color are held constant. It is the statistical increase in
cross-elasticity that is the critical determinant. If the cross-elasticity
is consistently low in both scenarios, then consumers perceive a dif-
ference between the products or the sources of the products. In this
case, the pink color only is serving its appropriate function of facili-
tating search, and is not acting as a barrier to competition. There-
fore, if and only if the cross-elasticity of demand increases when
competitive products bear the disputed pink color should that color
be freely available to competitors.
As another example, consider the use of a direct elasticity test in
156. Burgunder, supra note 44, at 413-14 n. 84. Pre-screening techniques must be used
to isolate the relevant consuming universe. See American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin In-
dus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9, 21 (D. Conn. 1962); Bayer, 272 F. at 505.
157. The initial prices should be set at current market levels so that cross-elasticity is
measured within the appropriate relevant range.
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the drug context. The problem, here, generally involves the potential
genericide of the color of a brand drug. Again, an investigation into
the effects of that color on demand elasticity is required. For in-
stance, suppose that Pfizer Inc. develops and receives a patent for a
brand drug called Lipodol, and markets the drug in round tablets
which are divided equally into green and white halves. After the pat-
ent expires, competitors wish to sell generic equivalents of Lipodol
with the same color scheme. Should this color combination be freely
available? In the first staging, a sample of persons familiar with Li-
podol will ask a "pharmacist" for Lipodol. The pharmacist will offer
the choice between Lipodol and drugs which he explains to be ge-
neric equivalents, although they have different color dresses. The
cross-elasticity of demand is measured by noting the shifts in demand
as the relative prices between Lipodol and the generic equivalent
drugs widen. The second staging will proceed in the same fashion
except that the generics will be one-half green and one-half white. In
the second scenario, customer confusion has to be controlled by ex-
plaining that Pfizer's product, Lipodol, is the green and white tablet
that consumers may have seen or used before. If the cross-elasticity
increases with statistical significance in the second stage of this ex-
periment, then the green and white color is serving, to some degree,
to segregate the market for this drug. In this case, competitors should
be allowed to use the color scheme, as long as they appropriately
distinguish the source of their drugs by other technical marks. 158
VI. CONCLUSION
The current state of the law regarding the protection of product
colors through trademark registration is in turmoil for two reasons.
First, courts have often coalesced distinct trademark concepts into the
category of functionality, thereby creating confusion as to the appli-
cability of the doctrine. Thus, it is time for courts to clearly distin-
guish the issues, concerning descriptive and generic product colors
from those regarding the functionality of such product colors. Sec-
ond, due to an apprehension over the issue of functionality, many
courts have lost sight of the appropriate role for trademark protec-
tion in the free market economy. For instance, some courts have be-
gun to interpret the Lanham Act and unfair competition law so as to
legally entitle manufacturers to supranormal' profits through trade-
158. According to the Cornpco decision, competitors have the right to freely imitate non-
protectable designs as long as they otherwise distinguish their products as to source. See supra
note 60 and accompanying text.
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mark protection. This is a direct contradiction to the Supreme
Court's Sears and Compco rulings. Courts should return to review-
ing these laws in terms of facilitating market efficiency. To this end,
an investigation into the color's effect on demand elasticity for the
product is of central importance. If there are any public policy rea-
sons for preferring a trademark system which bestows supranormal
profits to producers, Congress should clearly establish a system with
guidelines, similar to those for other statutory monopolies, which in-
dicates when there is a right to these profits and for how long.

